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Overview 
 Understanding of markets in traditional economics 
• Assumptions of neoclassical (traditional) school 
• Conditions for neoclassical markets to function  
 New Institutional Economics of markets 
• Markets as institutions 
• Transaction costs and institutional arrangements  
» Transaction costs and their types 
» Institutional arrangements: definition 
» Types of institutional arrangements 
» Transaction attributes 
 Summary 
 Implications for VC-IPs in Volta2 project 
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Understanding of markets in traditional economics 
 Traditional economics  
 dealt with the determination of equilibrium (market) prices  
 based on demand and supply of goods and services in the market 
 but what is market? 
place where buyers and sellers meet, exchange commodities and 
establish prices 
 
 consistent with neoclassical model of a capitalist economy  
 based on many unrealistic assumptions 
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Assumptions of neoclassical school 
 perfectly rational traders  
 full information 
 well-defined and stable preferences  
 homogeneous goods and services  
 self-interested actors 
 zero transaction costs (transaction hurdles)  
 information search, inspection, negotiation and bargaining, 
decision making and cost of making wrong decisions, 
monitoring and enforcement 
 “Pareto efficient” exchange equilibrium 
• Pareto efficiency: welfare of one actor couldn’t be improved without 
reducing welfare of someone else 
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Traditional/neoclassical model cont… 
 As long as transaction is costless, future is perfectly 
predicted, and individuals are perfectly rational, no 
need for a specific market organization 
 it doesn’t matter whether individuals trade frequently 
or only occasionally 
 it doesn’t' matter whether trade takes place between 
specific individuals or through a trading network of 
complex relationships  
 institutions assumed to be exogenous and non-evolving  
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Conditions for neoclassical markets to function  
 Well functioning constitutional rules 
–well-defined private property rights  
 all goods and services be privately owned and secured 
– contractual obligations  
 well functioning contractual laws and legal system that help 
enforce signed contracts and control wrong doings  
– obligations from tortuous acts 
 avoiding intentional and strategic acts that affect a trading partner 
 Supreme authority guarantying the rules 
Thus, who to trade with, nature of product, time and place of 
trade, time and mode of payment, etc. doesn’t matter 
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New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
 Real markets involve frictions,  
– positive transaction costs  
– heterogeneous goods and services 
– information  and power asymmetries between  market actors 
– imperfect foresight 
– boundedly rational economic actors:  
• intention to make rational decisions but substantively not so 
because of limited information and/or limited cognitive capacity 
• hence room for opportunism (self-interest seeking with guile)  
 Differences among actors with respect to their abilities, initial 
resource positions, information endowments, risk preferences, 
and a great variety of constraints in markets that limit options 
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Markets as Institutions 
 Two interrelated institutional choice problems  
1. choosing a specific market organization within which to 
undertake trade  
• problem of coordinating individual plans among many traders 
 
2. selecting, within that market organization, a specific contract to 
utilize in conducting exchange with a trading partner 
• problem of coordinating individual plans between two parties  
 Hence, importance of transaction costs and institutional 
arrangements in determining market outcomes 
 But, no systematic and complete theory in NIE yet 
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Transaction costs and institutional arrangements  
 Central objective of NIE: 
– identifying implications of given institutional arrangements 
for economic behavior  
• real life markets are imperfect  
• lowering transaction costs as the common goal  
 
 Important to understand characteristics and organization of 
specific markets 
 Transaction costs incurred both ex-ante and ex-post, in addition 
to those during the period of making exchange decision  
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1. Pre-contractual: Search and Inspection 
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A milk processing company may have to  
 look for fresh milk producing dairy farms 
 search for information on the list of prices  
 identify potential buyers of processed dairy products  
 check the qualities of milk from different producers  
 check their sustainable supply potential and integrity 
 identify the legal status of potential trading partners, etc. 
2. Contracting: agreeing on prices and other stipulations 
fresh milk seller and a processing company may 
have to negotiate and reach agreement on the 
terms:  
the price for a specific quality of milk 
the duration to stay in the trade relationship 
time and frequency of delivery 
mode and frequency of payment 
level of compensation in case either party fails to obey 
the terms of the agreement, etc. 
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3. Post-contractual: execution, control, and enforcement 
 a milk processing firm may need to employ a lawyer to take 
legal action against a milk supplier if  
 the milk is adulterated or not fresh 
of lower quality than the agreed upon one  
supply declines or abruptly stops, etc. 
 the milk producer may also incur transaction costs if the milk 
processer  
suddenly stops accepting milk or  
 fails to make payments as per the agreement, etc. 
 
• Contracts in NIE world don’t fully define future performances 
and don’t incorporate all risks  
– traders rather enter into adaptable cooperative exchange relationships 
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Institutional arrangements: definition 
 Institutional arrangement or governance structure  
– the ways in which transactions are organized  
– the mechanisms of delegation, distribution, or sharing of power 
related to management, decision-making and implementation 
authority 
 Type of governance structure in place  
 defines the processes and traditions that determine how power 
is exercised, how traders behave and make decisions, etc. 
 is determined by the level of transaction costs and attributes of 
transactions 
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Types of institutional arrangements 
1. Spot markets 
 automatic forms; no customer relationships and identities 
required for entering into a transaction  
 examples: market for processed milk, daily open market for 
vegetables, Safaricom SIM card from shops in Nairobi 
 
2. Hierarchies: also called firms or vertical integration 
 unified forms: transactions take place under the same 
administrative system 
 examples: when a milk processing firm starts producing fresh milk 
by itself or fully integrates with another dairy farm and make 
joint decisions 
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Types of inst. arrangements  cont… 
3. Hybrids or relational governance 
 intermediate forms whose attributes lie in between those of 
markets and hierarchies  
 traders have some level of freedom of action and some level of 
control from contracting partners 
examples: 
 (milk) cooperatives  
 whole seller-retailer agreements 
 network arrangements  
 strategic alliances 
 partnerships 
 “innovation platforms”  
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Transaction attributes 
Why do marketers choose one or the other type of governance 
structure? 
– Asset specificity 
• assets which have no value outside a particular 
transaction 
example: transaction agreement between XYZ bakery and  
University of Nairobi for particular sized and shaped bread 
for its student canteen involves specific asset  
– Uncertainity 
• inability to foresee eventualities  
– Frequency of transactions  
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Summary  
 Justifications for the use of conventional maximizing models 
– they are good predictors 
– basis for other derivatives of economics 
 In many real life situations, such models fail to produce the 
good results claimed by neoclassical economics 
 NIE  
 identified these failures and emphasized the roles played by 
transaction costs and bounded rationality  
 stressed the need for greater understanding of real–world 
markets through studying transaction costs in specific market 
organizations 
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Summary cont… 
 real world economies aren’t free of frictions 
– exchange involves transaction costs and bounded rationality that 
could lead to opportunism 
 market is considered not just “supply and demand 
determines the price”  
– set of rules and regulations, besides the price mechanism 
 Institutional issues and transaction costs are important as 
they affect coordination and shape incentives  
 Institutions and relationships are dynamic (evolving) 
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Implications for VC-IPs in Volta2 project 
 Application of NIE to analyze the impacts of VC-IPs on market 
performance  
 IPs as hybrid structures with formal and informal rules and 
contracts 
 Need to understand how VC-IPs in Volta2 project are organized, 
operate, and interact in the process of attaining local 
development objectives and institutional innovation 
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